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During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-border financial
transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i) receive capital
inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth; (ii) insure against
aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate the development of domestic
financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocation of capital and better sharing of
individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that this conventional view was wrong. In this paper,
we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financial liberalization. The
model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and the interactions between
domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financial liberalization might lead to
different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effects on net capital flows, investment,
and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investment and growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows
and unstable domestic financial markets. The model shows how these outcomes depend on the level
of development, the depth of domestic financial markets, and the quality of institutions
Fernando A. Broner
CREI and Universitat Pompeu Fabra










jventura@crei.catDuring the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-border
￿nancial transactions. The conventional view, part of the so-called Washington Consensus, was
quite optimistic regarding the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization. An authoritative rendition of such
view can be found in a famous speech by Stanley Fischer, Deputy Director of the International
Monetary Fund and world leading macroeconomist, who argued that:
￿Free capital movements facilitate a more e¢ cient global allocation of savings, and
help channel resources into their most productive uses, thus increasing economic growth
and welfare. [...] International capital ￿ ows have expanded the opportunities for portfo-
lio diversi￿cation, and thereby provided investors with a potential to achieve higher risk-
adjusted rates of returns. And just as current account liberalization promotes growth
by increasing access to sophisticated technology, and export competition has improved
domestic technology, so capital account liberalization can increase the e¢ ciency of the
domestic ￿nancial system. [...] These are not abstract concepts, but bene￿ts that every
country represented in this room has enjoyed as a result of its access to the international
capital markets.￿
Stanley Fischer, ￿Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF,￿speech
at the IMF Annual Meetings, September 19, 1997
Mounting empirical evidence (reviewed later) suggests that this conventional view was wrong
however.1 Some of the richer emerging markets have indeed received substantial capital ￿ ows. But
the experience of other rich emerging markets and most of the poorer ones is that capital ￿ ows
have been quite small or even negative. Overall, there is no evidence that ￿nancial liberalization
systematically increases investment or growth in emerging markets. Capital ￿ ows have also been
highly volatile and procyclical, and there is evidence that ￿nancial liberalization has increased both
output and consumption volatility. There is also evidence that ￿nancial liberalization has made
domestic ￿nancial markets more unstable and prone to crises. Perhaps the most robust ￿nding is
that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization vary substantially across countries. Speci￿cally, the e⁄ects
of ￿nancial liberalizations depend on whether the liberalizing country is rich or poor, on whether
it has developed or underdeveloped ￿nancial markets, and on whether it has high- or low-quality
institutions.
Why was the conventional view wrong? Our answer is that it failed to anticipate the full e⁄ects
of ￿nancial liberalization on debt enforcement. The conventional view was certainly aware of the
1In fairness, Fischer also warned that ￿capital account liberalization increases the vulnerability of the economy to
swings in market sentiment,￿and that ￿this is a valid concern to those contemplating capital account liberalization,
and for the international community.￿We have much to say in this paper about these swings in market sentiment.
1problems associated with the enforcement of foreign debts. After all, most ￿nancial liberalizations
in emerging markets took place in the aftermath of the 1980s international debt crisis. But this
view ignored key interactions between foreign and domestic debts by implicitly assuming that the
latter would be enforced even if the former were not.2 And yet such discrimination is hardly feasible
in real-world ￿nancial markets. In the case of bonds and stocks, discriminating against foreigners is
di¢ cult because they can resell these assets to domestic residents in secondary markets.3 Even when
asset trade is intermediated by banks and other ￿nancial institutions, discrimination is di¢ cult since
it is not possible to know the nationality of the clients of these intermediaries or how default losses
would be distributed among them. Finally, courts often abide by equal-treatment rules that limit
the possibility of discrimination based on nationality.4
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a theory that recognizes the di¢ culty of
discriminating between domestic and foreign creditors can explain the di⁄erent country experiences
after ￿nancial liberalization. To do this, we develop a tractable analytical framework that extends
the popular Solow model to allow for imperfect debt enforcement. Despite its simplicity, this frame-
work is a rich source of testable hypotheses linking the success or failure of ￿nancial liberalization
to observable country characteristics such as initial income, savings, the level of productivity, the
quality of enforcement institutions and luck.5
Let us start by asking why capital ￿ ows to some emerging markets have been quite small and
sometimes even negative. The conventional view recognized that foreign sources of ￿nancing would
be risky, as the temptation for opportunistic default combined with low-quality institutions were
likely to generate recurrent foreign debt crisis. But it also assumed that domestic savings would
stay at home, and the new foreign sources of ￿nancing would constitute a net addition to overall
development ￿nancing. If debt enforcement is not discriminatory however, defaults will not only
a⁄ect foreign debts but also domestic ones. If defaults happen anyway, domestic savers will ￿nd
it optimal to send part or all of their savings abroad. This detrimental ￿capital ￿ ight￿e⁄ect was
not anticipated by the conventional view. But it means that ￿nancial liberalization not only adds
new foreign sources of ￿nancing that are cheap but risky, but also subtracts domestic sources of
2The conventional view builds on an extensive theoretical work (reviewed later) that was motivated by the 1980s
debt crisis. This literature highlights the problems associated with enforcing foreign debts, but assumes that domestic
debts are always enforced.
3See Broner, Martin and Ventura (2008 and 2010).
4There are a few recent papers that also assume that debt enforcement/repayment is non-discriminatory. Broner
and Ventura (forthcoming) explore the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the degree to which individuals can share
risks within and between countries. Kremer and Mehta (2000), Rappoport (2005), Brutti (2008), Gennaioli, Martin,
and Rossi (2009), Guembel and Sussman (2009), and Basu (2010) explore the role of non-discrimination in the
determination of government debt and tax policy.
5We are not, of course, the ￿rst to develop a formal model showing why the conventional view might be wrong.
We review below other theoretical papers that do this and relate their ￿ndings to ours.
2￿nancing that were expensive but safe. This tends to raise gross capital ￿ ows but has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on net capital ￿ ows and overall development ￿nancing.
Let us ask next why ￿nancial liberalization has led to substantial capital ￿ ows to some emerging
markets that were already somewhat rich. The conventional view was that these countries would
bene￿t from ￿nancial liberalization, but probably less so than poorer countries. The reason, of
course, is that these countries already had a substantial amount of domestic savings and their
needs for foreign ￿nancing were less acute. If debt enforcement is not discriminatory however,
enforcing domestic debts implies also enforcing foreign ones. If domestic markets are deep enough,
the desire to enforce domestic debts reduces or eliminates the temptation for opportunistic default
on foreigners. This bene￿cial ￿￿nancial depth￿e⁄ect, which was not anticipated by the conventional
view either, lowers the risk of foreign borrowing and raises capital ￿ ows.
Let us ask ￿nally why ￿nancial liberalization has led to capital ￿ ows that are volatile and
procyclical and has raised the instability of domestic ￿nancial markets. The two e⁄ects discussed
above suggest that two equilibria are possible depending on investor sentiment. If domestic savers
are pessimistic and think that the probability of default is high, they will prefer to send most of
their savings abroad. In this case, default a⁄ects mostly foreign debts and countries will prefer to
default ex-post, con￿rming the pessimistic beliefs. This equilibrium with small or negative capital
in￿ ows always exists. If instead domestic savers are optimistic and think that the probability of
default is small, they will keep their savings at home. In this case, default would a⁄ect mostly
domestic debts and countries will prefer not to default ex-post, con￿rming the optimistic beliefs.
This equilibrium with substantial capital in￿ ows exists only if domestic savings are high relative to
foreign borrowing. We describe these equilibria and show how changes in investor sentiment can
generate macroeconomic volatility and procyclical capital ￿ ows.
Our theory provides an example of how globalization strains existing institutions. We start
from a situation in which, despite imperfect enforcement institutions, domestic debts are enforced.
After ￿nancial liberalization, and despite no institutional change, domestic debts might no longer
be enforced. The basic point is that globalization a⁄ects policy incentives, sometimes accentuating
the shortcomings of imperfect institutions. This simple observation, which is key to understand
why the conventional view failed, is a main theme in this paper.
The paper is organized in four sections. Section 1 develops the basic analytical framework
used throughout the paper. This is a standard growth model of a capital-scarce country that is
not always willing to enforce its foreign debts. In this section, we assume that enforcement is
discriminatory and interpret the results as the conventional view. Section 2 considers the same
setup but assumes instead that enforcement is non-discriminatory. We analyze the optimistic and
3pessimistic equilibria discussed above, and characterize the conditions for their existence. Section
3 then uses these equilibria to derive the implications of the theory for the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
liberalization. This section collects the main results of this paper, and relates the success of ￿nancial
liberalization to the underlying country characteristics and luck. Section 4 concludes with some
speculative remarks on the potential role of economic policy. Before all of this, we o⁄er a short
discussion of the most relevant empirical and theoretical literatures.
Empirical literature:
There is a vast empirical literature on the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization. However, this
literature is subject to important data limitations. In particular, there is a small number of episodes,
￿nancial liberalizations are accompanied by other policy reforms, and countries probably take into
account the potential e⁄ects of liberalization when deciding whether to liberalize or not. As a result
of these data limitations, there is no strong consensus regarding the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization.
Regarding level e⁄ects, there are many cross-country studies that have shown that ￿nancial
liberalization in developing countries has not led to an increase in investment, growth, or even net
capital in￿ ows. See for example Rodrik (1998), Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001), Edwards
(2001), and Bon￿glioli (2008). Henry (2007) argues that liberalizations do increase investment
and growth, but that the e⁄ects are temporary. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) argue
that stock market liberalizations do increase growth. And Levchenko, Ranciere, and Thoenig
(2009) also ￿nd positive growth e⁄ects when analyzing industry level data.6 One robust result
in the literature is that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization depend on country characteristics.
In particular, Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001), Edwards (2001), Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2005), Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008), and Papaioannou (2009) show
that liberalization in developing countries leads to larger capital in￿ ows, and higher investment
and growth in countries with stronger institutions, more developed domestic ￿nancial markets, and
higher initial income.
Regarding volatility e⁄ects, there is some evidence that ￿nancial liberalization increases macro-
economic volatility. This was argued for the case of Latin America by D￿az-Alejandro (1985),
and in cross-country evidence by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
(2003). However, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) argue that stock market liberalizions lower
6Another important issue is whether, as suggested by Lucas (1990), the return to capital in developing countries
is not higher than in advanced countries due to productivity di⁄erences. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) present evidence
consistent with this interpretation. However, their methodology is based on the assumption that domestic ￿nancial
markets work perfectly, which is inconsistent with Banerjee and Du￿ o￿ s (2005) ￿ndings of very large di⁄erences in the
return to capital within developing countries. Also, during the ￿rst wave of ￿nancial globalization in the late 19th
century, when developing countries were e⁄ectively colonies and sovereign risk was less of a problem, capital ￿ ows to
developing countries were extremely high (see Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
4consumption volatility. As in the case of level e⁄ects, there is robust evidence that the e⁄ects of
liberalization depend on country characteristics. In particular, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2006) and Broner and Rigobon (2006) show that both consumption volatility and the volatility of
capital ￿ ows is higher in countries with weak institutions and underdeveloped domestic ￿nancial
markets. Also, Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) use long-run historical data to show that the frequency
of crises is a persistent characteristic of countries, although Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann
(2008) provide evidence that countries that are subject to crises grow on average faster than coun-
tries that follow a more cautious development strategy. For a thorough review of the e⁄ects of
￿nancial liberalizations, see the surveys by Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), Kose, Prasad,
Rogo⁄, and Wei (2009), and Obstfeld (2009).
There are a number of papers that provide evidence regarding the interactions of domestic and
international ￿nancial markets emphasized in this paper. In particular, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), Borensztein and Panizza (2008), Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2009), and Reinhart and
Rogo⁄ (2009) show that domestic ￿nancial crises are more frequent during periods of international
￿nancial integration, and that defaults on foreign debts are associated with domestic ￿nancial crises.
Theoretical literature:
The theoretical underpinnings of the conventional view were laid out by the maximizing models
that took over the ￿eld of international economics in the early 1980s. These models were designed
to study the pattern of capital ￿ ows and their macroeconomic consequences, and sprang from two
sources: (i) the so-called intertemporal approach (IA) to the current account studied the case in
which the costs of international risk sharing are prohibitive; and (ii) the open-economy versions of
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model went to the other extreme and studied the case in which
these costs are negligible. See Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1996) for a textbook treatment of these models.
In the case of industrial countries, Ventura (2003) shows that the IA models perform quite well
empirically. Instead, RBC models predict much more international risk sharing than observed in
the data. This is why a lot of the recent research in the ￿eld has focused on explaining why risk
sharing is so low among industrial countries. See the surveys by Lewis (1999), Karolyi and Stultz
(2003) and Sercu and VanpØe (2007).
In the case of emerging markets, it was recognized early on that neither the IA nor the RBC
models would prove appropriate.7 Recall that these models were being developed against the
background of the worst sovereign debt crisis since the 1930s. Consequently, a new class of models
was developed emphasizing the role of strategic default on foreign debts (also called sovereign risk).
7See Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) for a recent contrarian view.
5See the seminal papers by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Grossman and van Huyck (1988), Bulow and
Rogo⁄ (1989a and 1989b) and Atkeson (1991), and the excellent survey by Eaton and FernÆndez
(1995).8 It is widely believed that the predictions of these models for ￿nancial liberalization are
essentially the same as those of the IA models. Strategic default reduces the size of the e⁄ects,
but it does not change their nature.9 This is the view that we label ￿conventional￿and that we
challenge here. Taking as starting point a prototype model of strategic default, we show that this
view hinges on the unrealistic assumption that domestic debts are una⁄ected by default on foreign
debts. Once this assumption is removed, the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization can be quite di⁄erent
from those predicted by the IA models. Our work shows that there is much more to the models of
strategic default than what it has been uncovered so far, and that the classic research strategy of
extending the IA models to include strategic default has not been exhausted yet.
This is not to say that this is the only useful research strategy, of course. A number of papers
have challenged the conventional view by shifting the focus away from macroeconomic or sovereign
risk and towards microeconomic frictions in ￿nancial markets. In a seminal paper, Gertler and
Rogo⁄ (1990) showed that, if wealth plays a role as collateral when borrowing (as it is often the
case when various microeconomic frictions are present), autarky interest rates might be lower in
capital-scarce countries than in capital-abundant ones, even if the marginal product of capital is
higher. This might reverse the predictions of the IA models regarding the pattern of capital ￿ ows.
Boyd and Smith (1997) and Matsuyama (2004 and 2008) used this insight in related dynamic
models to show that ￿nancial liberalization can reduce investment and growth in capital-scarce
countries. These models have the ability to explain why capital ￿ ows towards countries that are
already somewhat rich and have developed ￿nancial markets.10;11
Of course, sovereign risk and microeconomic frictions are both important features of real
economies. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Tirole (2003) analyze the problem of sov-
ereign risk in the presence of frictions that a⁄ect private transactions, and explore various external-
ities. While Caballero and Krishnamurthy emphasize excessive private risk taking, Tirole focuses
8Further research after this survey includes Cole and Kehoe (1997), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Amador (2008), Arellano (2008), Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2009), Bai and Zhang
(2010), and Aguiar and Amador (forthcoming).
9It might however explain the composition of capital ￿ ows. See Kraay, Loayza ServØn and Ventura (2005).
10Focusing on the macroeconomic e⁄ects of microeconomic frictions when studying international capital ￿ ows has
become quite popular recently. See Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006), Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Antr￿s and Caballero (2009), Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) and Martin
and Taddei (2010), among others.
11A third, and quite interesting, line of research is that followed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) who develop
a model in which investments are indivisible and show that this is enough to overturn some of the conclusions of
the conventional view. In their framework, ￿nancial liberalization reduces investment and growth in capital-scarce
countries if the world is poor enough, but this trend reverses as the world grows richer. Martin and Rey (2006)
have shown that in this framework changes in investor sentiment can also generate macroeconomic volatility and
procyclical capital ￿ ows.
6on the problems that arise when individuals do not internalize how their actions a⁄ect government
policy. In three recent papers, Brutti (2008), Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi (2009), and Basu (2010)
have proposed models in which non-discriminatory defaults on sovereign debt reduce the net worth
of investors and thus create turmoil in domestic ￿nancial markets. These papers uncover crucial
interactions between international and domestic public debt and private ￿nancial transactions that
are highly complementary to the analysis in this paper.
1 The conventional view of ￿nancial liberalization
We develop next a stylized model of sovereign risk that captures the standard or conventional view of
the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization. According to this view, ￿nancial liberalization allows capital-
scarce countries to import capital leading to a surge in consumption, investment and economic
growth. Capital ￿ ows also make the economy less sensitive to savings shocks and more sensitive
to productivity shocks. Imperfect enforcement institutions reduce capital imports, moderating but
not reversing these e⁄ects.
1.1 Before ￿nancial liberalization
Consider a small country that initially lives in autarky. This country is inhabited by overlapping
generations of young and old. Each generation contains a continuum of individuals of measure
one. The young work, earn a wage and save part of it. The old retire and live o⁄ their savings.
The representative member of generation t (from now on ￿generation t￿for short) maximizes the
discounted expected utility of consumption:
Ut = u(ct;t) + ￿ ￿ Et [u(ct;t+1)] (1)
with ￿ > 0, u(￿) = ln(￿) and ct;t+1 is the consumption of generation t in period t + 1.
The output of the country is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function, f (kt) = k￿
t ￿ l1￿￿
t
with ￿ 2 (0;1), where kt and lt are the country￿ s capital stock and labor force. All individuals
supply one unit of labor inelastically when young and, thus, lt = 1 for all t. For each unit of output
invested in period t, A > 0 units of capital are obtained in period t + 1. Capital fully depreciates
in one generation. Markets are competitive and factors of production are paid the value of their
marginal product:
wt = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ k￿
t and rt = ￿ ￿ k￿￿1
t (2)
where wt and rt are the wage and the rental rate, respectively. Equation (2) determines how output
7is split between the young generation who owns labor and the old generation who owns capital.
There is no borrowing and lending across generations, since this type of trade requires interac-
tions in two di⁄erent periods. Since all individuals within a generation are identical, there is no
loss of generality in assuming no borrowing and lending within generations, and we can write the
budget constraints of generation t as follows:




ct;t+1 = rt+1 ￿ kt+1 (4)
Utility maximization leads each generation to save a fraction
￿
1 + ￿
of their wage. Since the wage
is itself a fraction 1￿￿ of output, the savings of the young generation consist of a constant fraction
s of the country￿ s output, where s ￿
￿
1 + ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿). Since the old do not save, the capital stock is
given by:
kt+1 = A ￿ s ￿ k￿
t (5)
Equation (5) is the law of motion of the capital stock before ￿nancial liberalization. From any
initial positive value, the capital stock monotonically converges to
kA
SS = (s ￿ A)
1
1￿￿ (6)
These dynamics are very familiar and need no further comment, since they are those of the classic
Solow model. Throughout, we assume that it is not possible to increase steady state consumption
by reducing the capital stock, that is, the economy is dynamically e¢ cient. This requires that the
investment rate be lower than the share of capital, i.e. s ￿ ￿.12 This assumption implies that the






1.2 After ￿nancial liberalization
By ￿nancial liberalization we mean the complete removal of legal and technological barriers imped-
ing the inhabitants of the country from accessing the international ￿nancial market. We think of
this market as containing many in￿nitesimal individuals from other, unspeci￿ed, countries whose
12See Abel et al. (1989) and Martin and Ventura (2010) for a discussion of this criterion. The latter paper also
provides a discussion of bubbly equilibria in a related model. We ignore these equilibria here.
8combined size is much larger than that of the country under study. This market is willing and able
to buy or sell any bond o⁄ering an expected gross return equal to one. This assumption ensures
that the country is capital scarce. It also ensures that the world economy is dynamically e¢ cient
and, as a result, increases in the capital stock cannot reduce consumption.
The conventional view acknowledges that, even after all technological and legal barriers are
removed, the presence of contract enforcement problems might limit access to the international
￿nancial market. Let zt+1 2 fE;Ng indicate whether generation t pays its debts when old. Then,
the international ￿nancial market o⁄ers the following contractual rates for borrowing and lending:
Rt+1 =
1
Prt [zt+1 = E]
and R￿
t+1 = 1, (7)
where Rt+1 is the contractual gross interest rate on one-period bonds issued by the country and sold
to the international ￿nancial market and R￿
t+1 is the contractual gross interest rate on one-period
bonds issued by the international ￿nancial market. The expected return on both bonds is the same,
as the di⁄erence in contractual rates re￿ ects only the probability of default.
The country is endowed with institutions whose objective is to ensure that debts are enforced.13
However, these institutions are imperfect and succeed only with probability ￿ 2 [0;1]. The parame-
ter ￿ is a measure of the quality of the country￿ s institutions and it plays a key role in the analysis.
When institutions succeed, the corresponding generation pays its debts. When institutions fail,
the corresponding generation chooses whether to pay its debts or default. Since default raises the
consumption and welfare of the generation, default is chosen whenever institutions fail:
Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿ (8)
This need not be the case once we go beyond the conventional view since some generations might
choose to pay their debts even when institutions fail.
Financial liberalization modi￿es the budget constraints of generation t as follows:
















rt+1 ￿ kt+1 + b￿
t+1 + bt+1 if zt+1 = E
rt+1 ￿ kt+1 + b￿
t+1 if zt+1 = N
(10)
13These institutions include law and order and the court system that upholds them, and are a⁄ected by the
credibility and actions of the country￿ s government. We have argued elsewhere that these institutions should also
include secondary markets (see Broner, Martin and Ventura 2008 and 2010). There is a an interesting literature that
also examines private enforcement mechanisms (see Dixit 2003).
9where b￿
t+1 denotes holdings of bonds issued by the international ￿nancial market, and bt+1 denotes
holdings of bonds issued by generation t. Obviously, b￿
t+1 ￿ 0 and bt+1 ￿ 0.
To determine the law of motion of the capital stock after ￿nancial liberalization, we use four
intermediate results which are proved in the Appendix:
1. Financial liberalization does not a⁄ect the savings of generation t, since the income and












= s ￿ k￿
t .
2. Generation t does not borrow and lend simultaneously since this would increase gross posi-
tions, and thus the risk of its portfolio, without a⁄ecting its expected return. That is, either
b￿
t+1 > 0 or bt+1 < 0, but not both.
3. If investing all savings at home would lower the return to capital below the world interest
rate, then generation t invests up to the point in which the return to capital equals the world
interest rate and lends the rest of its savings abroad. That is, if s ￿ A ￿ k￿




t+1 > 0 and ￿ ￿ A ￿ k￿￿1
t+1 = 1.
4. If investing all savings at home would not lower the return to capital below the world interest
rate, then generation t borrows and invests up to the point in which the return to capital
equals the world interest rate plus a risk premium that compensates for the fact that producing
capital ￿nanced by borrowing is risky. That is, if s ￿ A ￿ k￿
t < (￿ ￿ A)
1
1￿￿, then bt+1 < 0 and
A ￿ ￿ ￿ k￿￿1




Let ￿ be the value of the capital stock such that the country neither borrows nor lends, i.e.






￿￿(1￿￿). Then, the law of motion of the capital stock is given by
kt+1 = kD (kt)
where kD (kt) is de￿ned implicitly by
A ￿ ￿ ￿ kD (kt)







kD (kt) ￿ A ￿ s ￿ k￿
t
kD (kt)
if kt < ￿
0 if kt ￿ ￿
(11)
The map kD (￿) is continuous but has two di⁄erentiated segments. If kt < ￿, the map is strictly
increasing and concave. If kt ￿ ￿, the map is ￿ at. Figure 1 shows the laws of motion of the capital




10stock before (dashed line) and after (solid line) ￿nancial liberalization, that is, Equations (5) and
(11) respectively. Since savings is una⁄ected by ￿nancial liberalization, for each level of capital, the
di⁄erence between these two lines equals the net foreign asset position of the country. If the country
is capital poor, i.e. kt < ￿, ￿nancial liberalization shifts the law of motion upwards, indicating that
the country imports capital. If the country is instead capital rich, i.e. kt > ￿, ￿nancial liberalization
shifts the law of motion downwards, indicating that the country exports capital. In any case, from
any initial value the capital stock monotonically converges to a steady state de￿ned by:
kD
SS = [(￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ s) ￿ A]
1
1￿￿ (12)




￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ s
￿ 1
The reason is that importing capital is risky and generation t requires a risk premium to do so.
1.3 The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization (I): dynamics
Let ￿nancial liberalization happen in period tL, so that the dynamics of the capital stock are given
by Equation (5) if t < tL, and by Equation (11) if t ￿ tL. To streamline the discussion assume that
the country is below its autarky steady state when ￿nancial liberalization happens, i.e. ktL ￿ kA
SS.
Thus, the country is capital scarce in the usual sense. What are the main consequences of ￿nancial
liberalization on a capital scarce country? Broadly speaking, the conventional view points at two
main e⁄ects of this event on the development path of the country: (i) it raises the steady state
capital stock and consumption;15 and (ii) it speeds up the convergence towards this steady state.
Figure 2 plots the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the capital stock, consumption and foreign
borrowing. All variables are shown as deviations from the values they would have had in the absence
of ￿nancial liberalization, in the style of impulse-response functions. Since this event does not a⁄ect
15Throughout, we use the term ￿consumption￿to refer to average consumption. This average is computed across
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11savings, capital imports are net additions to capital accumulation. The ￿rst young generation after
liberalization borrows up to the point in which the return to capital equals the world interest rate
plus the appropriate risk premium. Initially this risk premium is high, re￿ ecting the large foreign
debt of the country. As the capital stock grows, so does the wealth of the following generations,
reducing the need for foreign ￿nancing and the risk premium. This leads to further rounds of capital
accumulation and debt reduction. In the steady state, the foreign debt stabilizes and the country
permanently enjoys a higher capital stock and consumption. Capital imports therefore accelerate
economic development, raising investment and growth along the transition and leading to a steady
state with higher consumption.
The relative importance of permanent (or steady-state) and transitional (or convergence) e⁄ects
of ￿nancial liberalization depend on the reason why the country is capital poor in the ￿rst place.
At one extreme, consider a country that is close to its steady state before ￿nancial liberalization
but has a low savings rate, i.e. ktL ￿ kA
SS and s << ￿. For this country, most of the bene￿ts
of ￿nancial liberalization are permanent, that is, the result of a change in the steady state. At
the other extreme, consider a country that is capital poor only because its initial capital stock is
low before ￿nancial liberalization, but its savings rate is high, i.e. ktL << kA
SS and s ￿ ￿. For
this country, most of the bene￿ts of ￿nancial liberalization are transitory, that is, the result of an
increase in the the speed at which the economy converges towards an unchanged steady-state. In
between these two extremes, ￿nancial liberalization has both permanent and transitory positive
e⁄ects on capital accumulation.
Interestingly, the increased rate of capital accumulation after ￿nancial liberalization is compat-
ible with an increase in consumption in all periods. Capital imports raise wages and lower the
rate of return to savings. The ￿rst young generation after liberalization does not bene￿t from
higher wages, but still ￿nds that the rate of return to its savings declines. This reduces its old
age consumption. But the next generation does bene￿t from higher wages and this increases its
consumption during youth. Unless most of the increase in wages is saved, aggregate consumption
increases even in the ￿rst period after liberalization.16 After this period, consumption is always
higher than what it would have been in the absence of ￿nancial liberalization.
A key aspect of the conventional view is the notion that the country can take advantage of
the development opportunities granted by ￿nancial liberalization only if it has good enforcement
institutions. To see this, note that the distance between the laws of motion before and after
liberalization depend on ￿. In the limiting case of perfect institutions, i.e. ￿ ! 1, the steady state




12increases the most and the whole transition takes place in a single generation. In the opposite
limiting case of lack of enforcement institutions, i.e. ￿ ! 0, neither the steady state nor the
transition towards it are a⁄ected by ￿nancial liberalization.
1.4 The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization (II): shocks
According to the conventional view, ￿nancial liberalization not only a⁄ects the country￿ s develop-
ment path, but it also a⁄ects the way it reacts to shocks. In particular, the conventional view says
that ￿nancial liberalization makes the economy (iii) less sensitive to savings shocks, and (iv) more
sensitive to productivity shocks.
To see this, we let the rate of time preference and the e¢ ciency of investment ￿ uctuate sto-
chastically across generations and write them as ￿t and At. For simplicity, we assume that the
processes ￿t and At are i.i.d. and independent of each other. Shocks to the rate of time preference
are easy to handle under the natural assumption that each generation knows its own preferences.
Shocks to the e¢ ciency of investment are a bit more tricky if generations are uncertain about their
own e¢ ciency. We sidestep any complication however by assuming that each generation also knows
its own e¢ ciency.17 Under these assumptions, Equations (5) and (11) still apply provided that we
replace s and A by st and At to recognize that these are no longer constants but instead follow
some exogenously given stochastic process. We refer to shifts in st and At as shocks to ￿savings￿
and ￿productivity￿respectively. Since generations cannot trade before they are born, these shocks
are uninsurable. Financial liberalization alters their macroeconomic e⁄ects though, as we shall see
shortly.
An e⁄ect of incorporating shocks to savings and productivity is that the capital stock no longer
converges to a steady state value kD





























are the lower bounds of the supports of the processes st and
At. The upper boundary ￿ kSS satis￿es ￿ kD
SS = kD ￿￿ kD
SS; ￿ s; ￿ A
￿
where ￿ s and ￿ A are the upper bounds
of the support of the processes st and At. The results in the previous section about the e⁄ects of
￿nancial liberalization on the location of the steady state and the speed of convergence towards it
still apply, although now we must remember that the steady state is an interval of capital stocks
rather than a single value.
The top panels of Figure 3 shows the impulse-response function of the capital stock (solid line)
and consumption (dashed line) to a transitory savings shock before and after ￿nancial liberaliza-
17See Kraay and Ventura (2000) and (2002) for a discussion of the e⁄ects of investment risk on capital ￿ ows.
13tion.18 The patterns exhibited by both variables are similar in both cases. The capital stock
increases on impact and then slowly returns to its steady state value. Consumption decreases dur-
ing the shock, then increases in the aftermath of the shock and slowly returns to its steady state
value. The main di⁄erence between the two responses is quantitative: the reaction of the capital
stock and consumption is smaller after ￿nancial liberalization than before it. The reason, of course,
is the behavior of capital ￿ ows. Before ￿nancial liberalization, the additional savings of generation
T are invested in the country. After ￿nancial liberalization, part of these additional savings are
used to reduce the foreign debt. As shown in the top panel of Figure 3, the foreign debt declines
on impact and then gradually builds up again as the economy returns to its steady state.19
The bottom panels of Figure 3 shows the impulse-response function of the capital stock (dashed
line) and consumption (solid line) to a transitory productivity shock before and after ￿nancial
liberalization.20 Once again, we see that the patterns exhibited by both variables are similar in both
cases. Both the capital stock and consumption increase on impact only to decrease slowly back to
their steady state values once the shock has disappeared. The di⁄erence between the two responses
is once again quantitative: the response of these variables is larger after ￿nancial liberalization than
before it. The reason, once again, is the behavior of capital ￿ ows. Before ￿nancial liberalization,
generation T did not raise its investment because, in our case of logarithmic utility, savings are not
a⁄ected by the shock. After ￿nancial liberalization, the savings of generation T is still una⁄ected
by the productivity shock. But now this generation can still raise its investment by increasing its
foreign debt. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that foreign debt increases on impact, then falls
once productivity returns to normal.
Financial liberalization therefore a⁄ects the volatility of the economic aggregates. If shocks
to savings are large and frequent relative to shocks to productivity, ￿nancial liberalization lowers
volatility. If, instead, shocks to productivity are large and frequent relative to shocks to savings,
￿nancial liberalization raises volatility. The reason is that ￿nancial liberalization leads to capital
￿ ows that dampen the e⁄ects of savings shocks and amplify the e⁄ects of productivity shocks on
the country.
18In particular, we assume that generation T is more patient than both earlier and later generations, i.e. sT > st = s
for all t 6= T. To allow for a clean comparison, we assume that the country had reached the steady state associated
with st = s and At = A in period T and plot the variables as deviations from this steady state. The only di⁄erence
between the two sets of responses is that in panel labeled ￿Autarky￿ we assume that T < tL; while in the panel
labeled ￿Financial liberalization￿we assume that T > tL.
19These time-series results also apply in the cross section. In particular, conditional on a given kt, countries
with higher s will have higher investment and growth and lower capital in￿ ows. This is consistent with Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2009), who ￿nd that capital tends to ￿ ow out of countries with high investment and growth. Their
interpretation of the data also emphasizes the di⁄erences in saving rates among developing countries.
20In particular, we assume now that generation T is more productive than both earlier and later generations, i.e.
AT > At = A for all t 6= T.
14Once again, the conventional view stresses that these e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization depend
on the quality of the country￿ s enforcement institutions. In the limiting case of perfect institutions,
i.e. ￿ ! 1, the capital stock no longer responds to savings shocks and exhibits the largest possible
response to productivity shocks. This is just the textbook case in which enforcement problems are
absent. In the opposite limiting case of lack of enforcement institutions, i.e. ￿ ! 0, the responses
of the capital stock to both types of shocks are una⁄ected by ￿nancial liberalization.
1.5 Discussion
After the resolution of the debt crisis of the 1980s, many emerging markets turned to ￿nancial
liberalization thinking that it would provide a fast track to development. Conventional models
such as the one above provided the intellectual underpinning for this policy option. According to
these models, capital imports would allow emerging markets to speed up the transition towards
the steady state and, possibly, even raise the steady state stock of capital and consumption. This
could be achieved without sacri￿ce, as consumption and investment would increase from the very
beginning.
The policy implications of this view are well known: ￿rst, emerging markets should eliminate
restrictions to international trade in assets and use capital imports to ￿nance development and over-
come their chronic shortage of savings. Once the ￿nancing problem was solved, emerging markets
should implement structural reforms that raise productivity and improve institutions, providing the
appropriate environment for ￿nancial liberalization to be e⁄ective. This policy package came to be
known popularly as the ￿Washington Consensus￿and, in some form or another, it was adopted by
a large number of emerging markets.
A couple of decades later, the evidence on the e⁄ects of this policy package is at best mixed, if not
at odds with the theory that underlies it. Capital often seems to ￿ ow in the wrong direction and its
impact on investment and growth is far from clear. Speci￿cally, it seems that this impact depends
on whether the liberalizing country is rich or poor, on whether it has developed or underdeveloped
domestic ￿nancial markets, and on whether it has high- or low-quality institutions. If anything,
those countries that seem to bene￿t more are already somewhat rich with a minimum level of
institutions and ￿nancial development. This has led many to argue that there exist threshold
e⁄ects.
Why have conventional models not been successful in accounting for the observed e⁄ects of
￿nancial liberalizations? We argue next that one possible reason is that they have not paid enough
attention to the problem of enforcing domestic debts. This omission is probably due to the wide-
spread use of the representative agent assumption which eliminates domestic trade altogether. In
15the rest of the paper we modify the conventional view by introducing heterogeneity and domestic
debts. We show that the resulting interactions between enforcing domestic and foreign debts pro-
vide a new and richer view of ￿nancial liberalization that goes a long way towards reconciling the
theory with the facts.
2 Enforcement of domestic and foreign payments
In this section, we introduce heterogeneity within each generation. This creates gains from domestic
borrowing and lending and raises the issue of enforcing domestic debts. One possibility is that
domestic debts are always enforced, even though foreign debts are not. This assumption underlies
the conventional view. We then propose the more realistic assumption that both domestic and
foreign debts are imperfectly enforced.
2.1 The basic setup with domestic trade
Assume now that only a fraction or measure " 2 [0;1] of individuals in each generation are capable
of converting output when young into capital when old. We refer to this group as ￿entrepreneurs￿
and the rest of the generation as ￿savers.￿ 21 Let It be the set of individuals that belong to generation
t, with typical element i 2 It. Then, de￿ne the sets of ￿entrepreneurs￿and ￿savers￿as IE
t and IS
t .
Naturally, It = IE
t [ IS
t and ? = IE
t \ IS
t . Throughout, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which
all entrepreneurs make the same decisions and all savers make the same decisions. The remaining
assumptions are as before. Thus, one way to interpret the conventional view is as the limiting case
in which " ! 1.
This slight change in the setup generates a role for domestic borrowing and lending, thus raising
two natural questions regarding enforcement. The ￿rst one refers to how con￿ ict among members
of a generation is resolved. When institutions fail, generations must decide whether to enforce debts
or not. Typically, there will be con￿ ict as entrepreneurs are debtors and savers are creditors.22 We
do not explicitly model the process by which generations make collective decisions. Instead, we
assume that these decisions are consistent with two principles: (i) an increase in the consumption of
any member of the generation is good; and (ii) a redistribution that reduces consumption inequality
within the generation is also good. In particular, we assume that generation t chooses enforcement
21Technically, we assume that savers can convert one unit of output when young into ￿ & 0 units of capital when
old. This ensures that (i) consumption is positive and utility is well de￿ned in and out of equilibrium, and (ii) savers
never choose to invest in equilibrium.
22In the previous section, this con￿ ict did not arise because all members of the generation were debtors.







jcit;t+1 ￿ ct;t+1j, (13)
where we adopt the convention of using the subscript i for individual variables and omitting the
subscript for aggregates or country averages, and ! 2 (0;1) is the weight on the second principle.
We assume that ! < 1 to ensure that an increase in the consumption of any individual is desirable
even if this raises inequality.23
The second question is whether it is possible to discriminate between domestic and foreign
debts when institutions fail. The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization depend crucially on the answer
to this question. Assume ￿rst that it is indeed possible to discriminate. Then, foreign debts
are enforced only with probability ￿ since defaulting on these debts raises domestic consumption.
Moreover, domestic debts are enforced with probability one since enforcing these debts reduce
consumption inequality without a⁄ecting average consumption. This recreates the conventional
view. Competition among entrepreneurs ensures that the interest rate on domestic debts equals
the return to capital, i.e. A ￿ rt+1, resulting in all members of the generation e⁄ectively having the
same budget set and making the same consumption choices. Aggregate production and savings
are not a⁄ected by heterogeneity, and the law of motion of the capital stock is still described by
Equations (5) and (11). All the previous analysis of the conventional view goes through.
What di⁄erence does it make if we interpret the conventional view as the case of homogeneous
individuals or we interpret it instead as the case in which individuals are heterogenous but there is
perfect discrimination? The answer is not much, except for the predictions about domestic trade.
Under the ￿rst interpretation, there should be no domestic trade. Under the second interpretation,
there should be domestic trade. Before ￿nancial liberalization, savers lend all of their savings to
entrepreneurs, and the latter invest these savings for them. After ￿nancial liberalization, all mem-
bers of the generation borrow from abroad the same amount (which is exactly the same amount
that the representative member of the generation borrowed in the previous section). Then, savers
lend to entrepreneurs not only their own savings but also what they have borrowed from abroad.
Entrepreneurs invest their own savings and foreign borrowing, plus the savings and foreign borrow-
ing of the savers. This pattern of trade allows savers and entrepreneurs to optimally share default
risk. We ￿nd the second interpretation more appealing and, as a result, in what follows we shall
think of the conventional view as the case of perfect discrimination.
Assume instead that it is not possible to discriminate. This makes no di⁄erence before ￿nancial
23We choose this particular ￿welfare function￿for analytical convenience. All our results would go through with
any welfare function satisfying the two principles mentioned in the text. We shall come back to this point in a later
footnote.
17liberalization. Since enforcing domestic debts reduces inequality and there are no foreign debts,
enforcement takes place with probability one. But the inability to discriminate makes a di⁄er-
ence after ￿nancial liberalization. When institutions fail, the corresponding generation faces an
enforcement trade o⁄ as it must balance the bene￿ts of enforcing domestic debts against the cost
of enforcing foreign debts. The country might choose to enforce foreign debts so as to make sure
that domestic debts are also enforced. In this case, all debts are enforced with probability one. But
the country might instead choose not to enforce domestic debts in order to avoid enforcing foreign
debts. In this case, all debts are enforced with probability ￿. We show all of this next.24
2.2 Before ￿nancial liberalization
Unlike the previous setup, we have now domestic debts before ￿nancial liberalization and we must
￿nd out the equilibrium enforcement choice. To do this, we conjecture ￿rst that Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1
and then check whether the resulting trade is consistent with generation t preferring to enforce
debts ex-post.
If Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1, entrepreneurs borrow up to the point at which the return to capital equals
the interest rate. This means that entrepreneurs do not obtain rents from their superior technology
and equally share the country￿ s capital income with savers. Thus, the consumption allocation is
cit;t+1 = ￿ ￿ k￿
t+1 for i 2 It, (14)
Does generation t have an incentive to enforce debts ex-post? If it did not, entrepreneurs would








￿ ￿ ￿ k￿
t+1 for i 2 IE
t
0 for i 2 IS
t
(15)
Substituting these consumption allocations into Equation (13) we ￿nd that enforcement is preferred.
The intuition is simple: enforcement reduces inequality without a⁄ecting average consumption.
This validates our initial conjecture proving that enforcement with probability one is indeed an
equilibrium. The same logic can be used to show that this equilibrium is unique.25
24In general, any model in which enforcing foreign debts is costly while enforcing domestic debts is valuable would
lead to qualitatively similar enforcement choices. See Brutti (2008), Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2009), and Basu
(2010) for related models in which enforcing domestic debts is desirable because it leads to higher investment and
output.
25Conjecture that enforcement takes place with probability Prt [zt+1 = E] 2 [￿;1). Given log utility, both savers
and entrepreneurs in generation t consume
1
1 + ￿
￿wt when young and
￿ ￿ Prt [zt+1 = E]
1 + ￿
￿wt ￿Rt+1 when old if there
is enforcement. However, consumption is higher for entrepreneurs when old if there is no enforcement. Since both
capital and bond holdings are the same when old in all states, enforcement would eliminate consumption inequality
18We conclude therefore that, in our setup with domestic trade, before ￿nancial liberalization
the law of motion of the capital stock is still given by Equation (5). This is not surprising since
discrimination (or the lack of it) plays a role only when foreigners enter the picture.
2.3 When enforcement of domestic debts leads to enforcement of foreign debts
The inability to discriminate makes a di⁄erence after ￿nancial liberalization since generations must
trade o⁄ the bene￿ts of enforcing domestic debts against the cost of enforcing foreign debts. We
start the analysis of this trade-o⁄ by constructing equilibria in which all debts are enforced with
probability one. To do this, we conjecture that market participants believe that Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1
and then check whether the resulting trade is consistent with generation t preferring to enforce
debts ex-post. We refer to this case as the optimistic one.
If debts are enforced with probability one, borrowing and lending rates are equalized, i.e. Rt+1 =
R￿
t+1 = 1. Since savers cannot invest, all their savings are allocated to bonds. Since bonds issued
by domestic residents and the international ￿nancial market are perfect substitutes, any mix of
domestic/foreign bond holdings that satis￿es
bit;t+1 + b￿
it;t+1 = s ￿ k￿
t (16)
with b￿
it;t+1 ￿ 0 is a maximizing portfolio for savers. Entrepreneurs can invest and maximization
leads them to do so until the return to capital equals the world interest rate:
A ￿ ￿ ￿ k￿￿1
t+1 = 1 (17)
Then, any mix of domestic/foreign bond holdings that satis￿es
bit;t+1 + b￿









it;t+1 ￿ 0 is a maximizing portfolio for entrepreneurs.
The next step is to determine whether the consumption allocation implied by these portfolios
is consistent with enforcement, as assumed. Since all individuals receive the same return to their
savings and this return equals one, the consumption allocation is
cit;t+1 = s ￿ k￿
t for i 2 It. (19)
without a⁄ecting its average. Therefore, generation t would actually prefer to enforce debts, which contradicts our
initial conjecture.
19Does generation t have an incentive to enforce debts ex-post? If it did not, entrepreneurs and savers







￿ ￿ ￿ k￿
t+1 + b￿
it;t+1 for i 2 IE
t
b￿
it;t+1 for i 2 IS
t
(20)
where kt+1 is determined by Equation (17). Since default a⁄ects only domestic debts, its impact
on consumption depends on the mix of domestic/foreign bonds in the portfolios of entrepreneurs
and savers. In particular, the larger the holdings of foreign bonds by entrepreneurs and savers, the
larger their consumption in case of default.
Even though maximization does not uniquely determine the mix of domestic/foreign bonds in
the portfolio of individuals, this mix a⁄ects the incentives to enforce. To validate our initial conjec-
ture that Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1, we must ￿nd a distribution of bond holdings that is consistent with
both individual maximization and enforcement of debts. If kt ￿ ￿, such a distribution always ex-
ists. Since the country is a net creditor, there exist distributions that are consistent with individual
maximization such that
R
i2It bit;t+1 = 0. With these distributions enforcement reduces inequality
without a⁄ecting average consumption.
If kt < ￿, the country is a net debtor and all distributions that are consistent with individual
maximization are such that
R
i2It bit;t+1 < 0. With these distributions enforcement still reduces
inequality but it also raises average consumption. To determine whether there exists a distribution
of bond holdings such that enforcement is still preferred, it is enough to analyze the distribution
that minimizes gross positions. As a result, we consider the (unique) distribution obtained by
setting b￿
it;t+1 = 0 and determining bit;t+1 residually from Equation (16) for i 2 IS
t and Equation
(18) for i 2 IE
t . Using Equation (13), it can be shown that this allocation leads to enforcement if
and only if 26
kt ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ! ￿ (1 ￿ "))
1
￿ ￿ ￿. (21)
where ￿ ￿ is the threshold level of capital such that the optimistic equilibrium exists if the capital stock
is above ￿ ￿, but does not exist if the capital stock is below ￿ ￿. Since ￿ ￿ < ￿, there always exist a range
of capital stocks such that the country repays its debts even if enforcement institutions fails. The
threshold ￿ ￿ re￿ ects the enforcement trade-o⁄ faced by generation t. On the one hand, enforcement
leads to foreign payments that reduce the average consumption of the generation. On the other
26To obtain this condition, calculate the objective function in Equation (13) with and without enforcement by
substituting the consumption allocations in Equations (19) and (20), setting b
￿
it+1 = 0 for all i 2 It. The calcu-
lation is simpli￿ed by the fact that, regardless of enforcement, jcit;t+1 ￿ ct;t+1j = ct;t+1 ￿ cit;t+1 for i 2 I
S
t and
jcit;t+1 ￿ ct;t+1j = cit;t+1 ￿ ct;t+1 for i 2 I
E
t .
20hand, enforcement leads to domestic payments that reduce inequality within the generation. The
higher the capital stock, the higher is the fraction of investment ￿nanced with domestic savings.
This lowers foreign payments and raises domestic ones, increasing the incentives to enforce. Thus,
there exists a threshold level for the capital stock such that enforcement is preferred for all capital
stocks above that threshold and not preferred for all capital stocks below it.
What prevents the generation from defaulting on its foreign debt is a distaste for the inequality
that default would bring about. This is why the threshold level of capital depends on " and !. If
default creates negligible inequality, i.e. " ! 1; or this inequality is not perceived as a problem,
i.e. ! ! 0; then nothing prevents generation t from defaulting on its debt whenever this debt
is positive, i.e. kt < ￿. If default leads to extreme inequality, i.e. " ! 0; and this inequality is
perceived as a serious problem, i.e. ! ! 1; then generation t never defaults on its debts.27
We conclude then that, for high enough levels of capital, there exists an equilibrium in which
enforcement takes place with probability one. In this equilibrium, kt+1 is the level that equalizes
the return to capital and the world interest rate. Thus, under the optimistic equilibrium the law
of motion of the capital stock is given by
kt+1 = kO ￿ (￿ ￿ A)
1
1￿￿ if kt ￿ ￿ ￿, (22)
Figure 4 shows the laws of motion of the capital stock before ￿nancial liberalization (dashed line)
and after ￿nancial liberalization in this equilibrium (upper solid line), that is, Equations (5) and
(22) respectively.28 With optimism, the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the law of motion of the
capital stock are qualitatively similar to and quantitatively stronger than those of the conventional
view. The ￿ at segment that characterizes the law of motion of the conventional view is extended
towards the left and applies even if the country imports capital.
What happens if this equilibrium does not exist? Even if this equilibrium exists, is it unique?
Or are there other equilibria? If so, how do these equilibria look like? The analysis of the case of
non-discrimination is not complete yet.
27The distribution of asset holdings that maximizes the incentive to enforce is characterized by savers consuming
zero in case of default. This is because their only source of income when old are domestic debts. Of course, with
any welfare function that penalizes in￿nitely zero consumption (e.g. average utility with log utility) the enforcement
condition would always be satis￿ed. This is not a robust result though, since in general individuals have other sources
of income. For example, individuals might receive wages or pension payments when old. Also, if there were other
sources of risk, even in the optimistic equilibrium savers would choose diversi￿ed portfolios including both domestic
and foreign debts.
28For the time being, ignore the bottom solid line.
212.4 When default on foreign debts leads to default on domestic debts
We construct next equilibria in which all debts are enforced with probability ￿. We refer to this
case as the pessimistic one. We conjecture that market participants believe that Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿
and, once again, then check whether the resulting trade is consistent with generation t preferring
not to enforce debts ex post.





t+1 = 1. Since savers cannot invest, all their savings are still allocated to bonds. But now bonds
issued by domestic residents and the international ￿nancial market are imperfect substitutes. Both
types of bond deliver the same expected return, but domestic bonds are risky while foreign bonds
are not. Since savers are risk averse, the former are more attractive and their maximizing portfolio
is now:
bit;t+1 = 0 and b￿
it;t+1 = s ￿ k￿
t (23)
Entrepreneurs can invest, but borrowing to do so is a risky activity. As a result, maximization
leads them to borrow until the return to capital equals the world interest rate plus the appropriate
risk premium:
A ￿ ￿ ￿ k￿￿1




The intuition for this risk premium is the same as in the conventional view, namely, a compensation
for borrowing risk. To reduce risk in their portfolios, entrepreneurs minimize their gross positions

























The next step is to check whether the consumption allocation implied by these portfolios is
consistent with lack of enforcement when institutions fail, therefore validating the initial conjecture
that Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿. But it is evident that this must be the case. Since savers only hold foreign
bonds, the only consequence of enforcement is to force entrepreneurs to pay foreign debts. This is
never preferred.
There always exists therefore an equilibrium in which enforcement takes place with probability
￿. In this equilibrium, kt+1 is the level that equalizes the return to capital to the world interest
rate plus the appropriate risk premium. Thus, under the pessimistic equilibrium the law of motion
of the capital stock is given by
kt+1 = kP (kt)
22where kP (kt) is de￿ned implicitly by
A ￿ ￿ ￿ kP (kt)







kP (kt) ￿ A ￿ " ￿ s ￿ k￿
t
kP (kt)
if kt < "￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿
0 if kt ￿ "￿ 1
￿ ￿ ￿
(26)
Figure 4 shows this law of motion (bottom solid line). For low levels of capital, ￿nancial
liberalization shifts the law of motion upwards, indicating that the country imports capital. For
higher levels of capital, ￿nancial liberalization shifts the law of motion downwards, indicating that
the country exports capital. Crucially, there is always a set of capital stocks lower than ￿ for which
the country exports capital even though it is capital scarce. This observation will play a key role
in the discussion of the next section.
Some intuition on the nature of the pessimistic equilibrium can be obtained by noticing that
Equation (26) is a downward shift of the law of motion of the conventional view, i.e. Equation (11).
In fact, as " ! 1, these two laws of motion converge. Why are capital imports and investment
lower in the pessimistic equilibrium than in the conventional view? The answer lies in the amount
of borrowing risk that entrepreneurs face. In the conventional view, entrepreneurs can borrow from
savers without risk. Thus, the total amount of funds available for investment that are not subject
to borrowing risk consists of the country￿ s savings, i.e. s ￿ k￿
t . In the pessimistic equilibrium,
entrepreneurs can no longer borrow from savers without risk. Thus, the total amount of funds
available for investment that are not subject to borrowing risk consists only of the entrepreneurs￿
own savings, i.e. "￿s￿k￿
t . This makes entrepreneurs more reluctant to borrow and lowers investment
and the capital stock.
This also explains why a capital-scarce country always imports capital in the conventional view,
while it is possible for a capital-scarce country to export capital in the pessimistic equilibrium. In
fact, we can use Equations (5) and (26) to ￿nd that there is a threshold level of capital such that
the country exports capital in the pessimistic equilibrium:
kt > ^ ￿ ￿
￿
￿




Since ^ ￿ < ￿, there always exist a range of capital stocks such that the country is capital scarce and
yet it exports capital.29 The threshold level ^ ￿ increases with the quality of enforcement institutions.
As ￿ ! 0, we have that ^ ￿ ! 0; while as ￿ ! 1 we have that ^ ￿ ! ￿.
29To gain intuition, consider the limit as borrowing risk tends to in￿nity. In the conventional view, investment
equals domestic savings: lim￿!0 kt+1 = s ￿ A ￿ k
￿
t . That is, the country neither imports nor exports capital. In the
pessimistic equilibrium, however, investment equals the entrepreneurs￿savings: lim￿!0 kt+1 = " ￿ s ￿ A ￿ k
￿
t . This
means that the country exports capital.
23Finally, we show that there are no other equilibria beyond the optimistic and pessimistic ones.
To do this, conjecture that Prt [zt+1 = E] 2 (￿;1). Risk averse savers prefer foreign bonds to
domestic ones and their maximizing portfolio is given by Equation (25). Entrepreneurs only borrow
from foreigners. As a result, enforcement does not a⁄ect savers and only forces entrepreneurs to
pay their debts to foreigners. Thus, generation t prefers not to enforce debts and this contradicts
the initial conjecture.
2.5 Equilibria without discrimination
A key feature of the theory developed here is that beliefs about enforcement might be self-ful￿lling.
As a result, a full description of equilibrium requires us to make assumptions about these beliefs. We
say that period t is optimistic if market participants in this period believe that Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1.
We say that period t is pessimistic if market participants in period t believe that Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿.





kO if Prt [zt+1 = E] = 1
kP (kt) if Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿
(27)
As is usually done in models with multiple equilibria, we assume that expectations or beliefs are
driven by sunspots. The sunspot materializes before savings and investment decisions are made in
each period t and determines the beliefs of generation t. If the sunspot takes the value ￿optimistic,￿
the optimistic equilibrium is played if it exists. Otherwise, the pessimistic equilibrium, which always
exists, is played. Let pt be the probability that the sunspot take the value optimistic.
If kt < ￿ ￿, only pessimistic beliefs are self-ful￿lling and we have that:
Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿ if kt < ￿ ￿. (28)
If kt ￿ ￿ ￿ instead, both optimistic and pessimistic beliefs are self-ful￿lling. In this case, we have
that:




1 with prob. pt
￿ with prob. 1 ￿ pt
if kt ￿ ￿ ￿. (29)
Theory does not impose any restriction on the stochastic process governing pt. Thus, we shall
emphasize those results that do not depend on the characteristics of this process. To avoid some
knife-edge solutions, we shall also assume that pt 2 (0;1) for all t. This implies that, if kt ￿ ￿ ￿,
there is always some uncertainty about the equilibrium that will be played.
To characterize the dynamics of this system it is useful to de￿ne the pessimistic steady state as
24the limiting state of an economy in which Prt [zt+1 = E] = ￿ for all t. In this limiting state, the
capital stock is given by:
kP
SS ￿ [(￿ ￿ ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ " ￿ s) ￿ A]
1
1￿￿ (30)
Then, we have the following result:
1. If kP
SS < ￿ ￿, the capital stock converges to kP
SS. If the initial position is below the threshold
￿ ￿ this convergence is monotonic. If the initial position is above the threshold ￿ ￿, ￿ uctuations
in investor sentiment generate ￿ uctuations in the capital stock until a long enough sequence
of pessimism eventually takes the economy below the threshold. After this, optimism is no
longer possible and the capital stock monotonically converges to kP
SS.
2. If kP










1￿￿. Abusing the language somewhat, we refer to kO
SS as the optimistic steady state.
Once this interval is reached, the capital stock ￿ uctuates forever within it. From any initial
position, convergence to the steady state is monotonic.
To provide some economic intuition for this result, use the de￿nitions of kP
SS and ￿ ￿ to show
that:
kP














That is, the country converges to the pessimistic equilibrium kP
SS if it has a low savings rate (low
s), bad enforcement institutions (low ￿) and generations do not care much about the inequality
created by defaults (low !). When such a collection of ￿bad￿country characteristics is present
optimism is, at most, a transitory situation. Only pessimism exists in the long run. Conversely,






if it has a high savings rate (high
s), good enforcement institutions (high ￿) and generations dislike the redistributions generated by
defaults (high !). These ￿good￿country characteristics do not rule out pessimism, but they make
optimism possible.
3 Rethinking the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization
The conventional view adopts the representative agent assumption, implicitly assuming that all
domestic debts are enforced even when foreign ones are not. We have kept all the assumptions that
characterize this view, except for this single one. Instead, we have assumed that such discrimination
25is not possible. We describe next how this apparently small change leads to a major rethinking of
the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalizations.
3.1 The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization (I): dynamics
Since ￿nancial liberalization happens in period tL, the dynamics of the country are given by Equa-
tion (5) if t < tL, and by Equations (27), (28), and (29) if t ￿ tL. We ask again about the
consequences of this event in a capital-scarce country. Recall that the conventional view is that
￿nancial liberalization (i) raises the steady state capital stock and consumption; and (ii) speeds up
the convergence to this steady state. Without discrimination, we obtain a non-conventional view
of the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization that can be quite di⁄erent.
Figure 5 plots the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization on the capital stock, consumption and foreign
borrowing without discrimination. As in Figure 2 (which plots the alternative case with discrimi-
nation), all variables are shown as deviations from the values they would have had in the absence
of ￿nancial liberalization. Figure 5 is drawn for the case of a country such that ktL < ^ ￿ < ￿ ￿ < kP
SS,
that is, for the case depicted in Figure 4. The ￿rst interesting aspect of the dynamics depicted in
Figure 5 is that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization vary over time, as the country goes through
three di⁄erentiated phases. In the ￿rst two of them, only pessimism is possible. In the third and
last phase, optimism is possible too.
The ￿rst phase is that in which ktL ￿ kt < ^ ￿. In this phase ￿nancial liberalization has the same
qualitative e⁄ects as in the conventional view: the country borrows to accelerate capital accumu-
lation and increase consumption simultaneously. This raises growth and speeds up convergence to
the steady state. Quantitatively, these e⁄ects are smaller here than in the conventional view. The
reason is that, unlike the conventional view, the risk of default induces savers to place their savings
abroad and these no longer constitute a source of riskless funds for entrepreneurs. As domestic lend-
ing dries up, entrepreneurs turn to the international ￿nancial market to ￿nance their high-return
investments. But foreign borrowing is riskier than the domestic borrowing that it substitutes. For
each level of investment, the risk premium is now higher than in the conventional view and, as a
result, entrepreneurs borrow less than in the case of discrimination of Figure 2. Despite this, in this
￿rst phase the borrowing by entrepreneurs still exceeds the lending by savers, and the country as a
whole is importing capital. Since savings are una⁄ected by ￿nancial liberalization, capital imports
raise investment and growth.
As time goes on, generations become richer leading savers to lend more abroad and entrepreneurs
to borrow less from abroad. This means that capital imports decline. Eventually the country
becomes a net creditor and this starts the second phase of ￿nancial liberalization, i.e. that in
26which: ^ ￿ ￿ kt < ￿ ￿. Despite being capital scarce, in this phase the country ends up exporting
capital and this lowers investment and growth. The cost of borrowing is on average lower than
in autarky, but it is also riskier and this second e⁄ect now dominates. Initially, the capital stock
and consumption still remain above the levels that these variables would have had in the absence
of ￿nancial liberalization. But this only re￿ ects the accumulated gains during the ￿rst phase.
Eventually, the drop in investment and growth catches up and the capital stock and consumption
become lower than they would have been in the absence of ￿nancial liberalization. By this time,
￿nancial liberalization has slowed down the convergence process.
Even then, the country keeps growing at a positive rate and eventually enters the third phase
in which ￿ ￿ ￿ kt and optimism becomes possible. If beliefs remain pessimistic, entering this third
phase makes no di⁄erence whatsoever. But there is a period (Figure 5 assumes this is the ￿rst
period in which optimism is possible) in which there is a change in investor sentiment and market
participants become optimistic. Savers keep their savings in the country, and entrepreneurs expand
their borrowing and investment until the marginal product of capital equals the world interest rate.
This leads to a surge in capital imports and the country converges to the optimistic steady state
kO
SS in a single generation. While optimism continues, the country enjoys high levels of capital and
consumption, plus ￿nancial stability.
Eventually, however, a change in investor sentiment leads to pessimism and generates what,
following an large literature on this topic, we describe as a ￿sudden stop￿ of capital imports.30
Savers send their savings abroad and entrepreneurs cut back on their investments as borrowing
becomes risky again. The country starts exporting capital and the capital stock and consumption
fall, gradually approaching the pessimistic steady state kP
SS. When enforcement institutions are
imperfect, sudden stops of this sort are recurrent. The long-run average capital stock and its






; and the properties of
the sunspot, i.e. pt. In all cases (and in the absence of additional shocks), ￿nancial liberalization
increases the volatility of the capital stock in the long run. Its e⁄ect on the long-run average capital




Figure 5 provides a stylized account of ￿nancial liberalization without discrimination. The
picture that emerges is much richer than the conventional view. We discuss next the role of various
country characteristics in determining the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization. In particular, we focus
on the initial level of development (ktL), productivity (A), the quality of enforcement institutions
(￿) and savings (s):
30The term sudden stop was introduced by Dornbusch, Goldfajn, and ValdØs (1995).
271. (Initial level of development) Figure 5 shows the case of a country that liberalizes at a low
level of development and goes through three di⁄erent phases. During the initial phase, the
country imports capital and growth accelerates. If ￿nancial liberalization takes place at an
intermediate level of development, i.e. if ^ ￿ < ktL < ￿ ￿, the country skips this phase and enters
directly into the second phase. Thus, ￿nancial liberalization leads to capital exports and slows
down growth. If ￿nancial liberalization takes place instead at high levels of development, i.e.
￿ ￿ < ktL, the country skips the ￿rst two phases and moves directly to the third phase in which
both the pessimistic and optimistic equilibria exist. In this case, ￿nancial liberalization leads
to capital imports and higher growth if beliefs are optimistic, but to capital exports and lower
growth if beliefs are pessimistic. In any case, ￿nancial liberalization creates a recurrent cycle
of high- and low-growth periods.
2. (Productivity) In this model, A scales up all laws of motion by the same factor and therefore
does not fundamentally a⁄ect the results. As is common in growth theory, we could have
expressed the capital stock adjusted by productivity, i.e. ^ kt = A
￿ 1
1￿￿ ￿ kt. All the results
derived in the previous point for the initial capital stock would apply to this quantity. That
is, what matters for the dynamics of the economy is the productivity-adjusted capital stock,
and not the capital stock by itself.
3. (Quality of enforcement institutions) As ￿ increases relative to the case in Figure 5, the
threshold ^ ￿ increases while the threshold ￿ ￿ is una⁄ected. As a result the second phase
becomes shorter and might not even exist. Moreover, in the third phase the steady state
interval becomes narrower and this leads to smaller ￿ uctuations and a higher average capital
stock. As ￿ decreases relative to the case in Figure 5, the pessimistic steady state becomes
lower and eventually we get to the case in which kP
SS < ￿ ￿. In this case, the third phase
disappears as the fundamentals cannot support optimism.
4. (Savings) Changes in s do no a⁄ect the relative position of the two thresholds ^ ￿ and ￿ ￿. As s
increases relative to the case in Figure 5, the law of motion under pessimism becomes closer
to that under optimism and, as a result, we have that the average capital stock increases and
its volatility decreases. As s decreases relative to the case in Figure 5, the opposite occurs.
If s falls enough, eventually we ￿nd that ^ ￿ < kP
SS < ￿ ￿ or even kP
SS < ^ ￿ < ￿ ￿. That is, the
country reaches the new steady state and stops growing before leaving the second or even the
￿rst phase.
As this analysis shows, without discrimination, it is not in general the case that ￿nancial
28liberalization in a capital scarce country raises the steady state capital stock and consumption and
speeds up the convergence process towards this steady state. The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization
on the growth process are much richer than this and depend in a subtle but quite clear way on the
speci￿c characteristics of the country that is liberalizing.
3.2 The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization (II): shocks
In the conventional view, ￿nancial liberalization makes the economy (iii) less sensitive to savings
shocks, and (iv) more sensitive to productivity shocks. As we show next, when enforcement is
nondiscriminatory the e⁄ects of shocks after ￿nancial liberalization can be quite di⁄erent.
As in the case of discriminatory enforcement, we can easily extend the model with non-
discriminatory enforcement by letting the discount factor ￿t and the investment productivity At
￿ uctuate stochastically across generations.31 Recall that in the absence of shocks, the economy
either converged to a steady state, kP







, over which both equilibria exist. If the support of the shocks
is not too wide, these long-run dynamics are not qualitatively a⁄ected, except that now in both
cases the economy converges to steady state intervals. If instead the support of the shocks is wide
enough, these intervals overlap and ￿connect￿states in which only the pessimistic equilibrium exists
and states in which both equilibria exist. In this case, the economy converges to a steady state
interval such that sometimes only the pessimistic equilibrium exists and sometimes both equilibria
exist.32 The results of the previous section on the location of the steady state and the speed of
convergence towards it still apply, even if shocks enlarge the steady state interval and make the
two key thresholds ^ ￿t and ￿ ￿t now a function of the shocks.
The most obvious di⁄erence between the non-conventional view developed here and the con-
ventional view presented in section 2 is that, if kt ￿ ￿ ￿t, ￿nancial liberalization creates a new
source of shocks, namely, self-ful￿lling shifts to investor sentiment or sudden stops. These shifts
31As before, we assume that each generation knows both ￿t and At when making its savings and investment
decisions. As a result, Equations (27), (28), and (29) still apply provided we replace s and A by st and At. As in
section 1.4, we assume that the processes ￿t and At are i.i.d. and independent of each other.




































The ￿rst inequality guarantees that, even if the economy starts at a high level of capital such that both equilibria
exist, after a long enough sequence of pessimism, low savings s
ﬂ
, and low productivity A
ﬂ
, the optimistic equilibrium
ceases to exist if savings remain low at s
ﬂ
and productivity increases to ￿ A. The second inequality guarantees that,
even if the economy starts at a low level of capital such that only the pessimistic equilibrium exists, after a long
enough sequence of high savings ￿ s and high productivity ￿ A, the optimistic equilibrium becomes possible if savings
remain high ￿ s and productivity drops to A
ﬂ
.
29have been modeled with the help of a sunspot variable that takes the value optimism with some
exogenously given probability pt. Optimistic periods are characterized by capital imports, high
investment and growth. Pessimistic periods are characterized by capital exports, low investment
and growth. Shocks to investor sentiment di⁄er from standard shocks to savings and productivity
in that they do not a⁄ect aggregate resource constraints. Instead, they capture the notion of the
country getting into and out of a coordination failure. Unless ￿nancial liberalization also makes the
economy less sensitive to standard shocks to savings and productivity, a ￿rst implication is that
aggregate volatility will increase. Ceteris paribus, this increase in volatility is higher in countries
with low level of development (ktL), high productivity (At), low quality of enforcement institutions
(￿), and low savings (st).
A second and more subtle implication is the possibility that standard shocks to savings and
productivity have new and non-conventional e⁄ects through changes in investor sentiment. This
might happen if shocks to savings and productivity move the country in and out of the region in
which optimism is possible, i.e. the shocks move the economy from kt ￿ ￿ ￿t to kt < ￿ ￿t or viceversa.
Shocks to savings and productivity might also a⁄ect investor sentiment if these shocks are used
by market participants to coordinate to pessimism or optimism, i.e. when the sunspot depends on
exogenous shocks.
Once we allow for interactions between shocks to savings and productivity and investor senti-
ment, the theory becomes much richer and might lead to somewhat surprising results.33 Consider,
for instance, the case of a country that is initially in the region where the optimistic equilibrium
is not possible and experiences a transitory positive shock to savings. This case is plotted in the
top-left panel of Figure 6. The increase in savings makes optimism possible, leading savers to keep
their savings at home, and creating an investment boom that raises future capital. This means
that optimism remains possible even after the shock to savings is gone. Thus, a transitory increase
in savings leads to a surge in capital imports, and a large and persistent increase in investment and
growth. Conversely, a reduction in savings may make optimism impossible, leading to capital ex-
ports and a large and persistent reduction in investment and growth. The top-right panel of Figure
6 shows this case. These two panels illustrate an important result, which was ￿rst discussed in the
previous section: increases in savings lower ￿ ￿t, sometimes making optimism possible and raising
capital imports. This prediction is just the opposite as the one we would get from the textbook
model which says that increases in savings should reduce capital imports.
33In the absence of these interactions, the e⁄ects of shocks to savings and productivity are essentially the same as
in the conventional view. Namely, ￿nancial liberalization makes the economy less sensitive to savings shocks, and
more sensitive to productivity shocks. The only di⁄erence is that these e⁄ects are stronger in optimistic periods than
in pessimistic ones.
30Consider now the case of a country that came from an optimistic period and experiences a
transitory increase in productivity. This case is shown in the bottom-left panel of Figure 6. The
increase in productivity makes optimism impossible, leading savers to put their savings abroad and
entrepreneurs to cut back their investments. The result is a collapse in capital imports which turn
to exports, and a drop in investment and growth. This means that optimism is not possible even
after the productivity shock is gone. Thus, a transitory increase in productivity leads to a collapse
in capital imports, and a large and persistent decline in investment and growth. Conversely, a
reduction in productivity may make optimism possible, leading to capital imports and a large and
persistent increase in investment and growth. The bottom-right panel of Figure 6 plots this case.
These two panels illustrate another important result, which was ￿rst discussed in the previous
section: increases in productivity raise ￿ ￿t, sometimes making optimism impossible and reducing
capital imports. This prediction is again just the opposite as the one we would get from the
textbook model which says that increases in productivity should increase capital imports.
As this analysis shows, ￿nancial liberalization introduces shocks to investor sentiment as a
new source of macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, it is not in general the case that ￿nancial
liberalization makes a country less sensitive to savings shocks and more sensitive to productivity
shocks. The reason is that these shocks might a⁄ect investor sentiment leading to outcomes that
are quite di⁄erent from what standard theory predicts.
3.3 Discussion
We argued above that the conventional view is unable to explain the variety of country experiences
observed after many emerging markets turned to ￿nancial liberalization in the aftermath of the
debt crisis of the 1980s. We asked then whether the problem with this view could be traced to the
assumption that all domestic debts are enforced even when foreign ones are not. To answer this
question, we re-constructed the theory without this assumption and obtained the results discussed
in the previous two sections. It seems fair to ask now whether these new theoretical results might
help us achieve a better understanding of the observed e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization in emerging
markets.
The most distinguishing aspect of the theory developed here is that the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
liberalization should vary across capital-scarce countries, depending on a variety of well-identi￿ed
country characteristics. In particular, we should consider two groups of countries based on whether
they are below or above a threshold (which itself depends on country-speci￿c characteristics). On
the one hand, we have the set of ￿poor￿emerging markets for which ktL < ￿ ￿t and optimism is
not a possibility. On the other hand, we have the set of ￿middle-income￿emerging markets for
31which ktL < ￿ ￿t and optimism is indeed possible. The e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization should vary
between and also within these groups.
Consider ￿rst the case of ￿poor￿ emerging markets. The conventional view recognized that
foreign sources of ￿nancing would be risky, as the temptation for opportunistic default combined
with low-quality enforcement institutions were likely to generate recurrent foreign debt crisis. But
even then, the ability to discriminate against foreigners would keep the domestic payments system
insulated from these crises. As a result, domestic savings would stay at home still available for
entrepreneurs, and the new foreign sources of ￿nancing would constitute a net addition to overall
development ￿nancing. The result would invariably be higher investment and growth.
What the conventional view did not realize is that it is quite di¢ cult to insulate domestic debts
from opportunistic defaults on foreign debts. Discriminating against foreigners is not possible when
foreign ￿nance takes the form of bonds and stocks, since foreigners can resell these assets to domestic
residents in secondary markets in anticipation of default. Even when ￿nancing is intermediated
by banks and other ￿nancial institutions, discrimination is di¢ cult because governments might
not know the identity of their clients or how these intermediaries distribute gains/losses among
them. Once domestic savers understand that defaults will not only a⁄ect foreign payments but also
domestic ones, they ￿nd it optimal to send part or all of their savings abroad. This detrimental
￿capital ￿ ight￿e⁄ect was not anticipated by the conventional view.
Financial liberalization has then unclear e⁄ects on the overall amount of ￿nancing that is
available for investment and growth. It adds new foreign sources of ￿nancing that are cheap but
also risky, and it also subtracts domestic sources of ￿nancing that were expensive but also safe.
In really poor countries with little domestic savings to start with, this capital-￿ ight e⁄ect is not
likely to be quantitatively important and, as a result, ￿nancial liberalization is likely to add to
development ￿nancing. The opposite might happen in not so poor countries with a reasonable
amount of domestic savings. In these countries, the capital-￿ ight e⁄ect might be so severe that
￿nancial liberalization does in fact subtract from development ￿nancing even if the country is
capital-scarce.
Consider next the case of ￿middle-income￿countries. The conventional view was that these
countries would bene￿t from ￿nancial liberalization, but probably less than the ￿rst group of poor
countries. The reason, of course, is that these countries already had a substantial amount of do-
mestic savings and their needs for foreign ￿nancing were less acute. Within this group of countries,
the e⁄ects of ￿nancial liberalization depend on self-ful￿lling expectations. Some of them might be
lucky (able?) and coordinate to the optimistic equilibrium and ￿nd that ￿nancial liberalization
is surprisingly successful, well beyond what the conventional view predicted. The reason is due
32to a second e⁄ect that the conventional view did not anticipate either: optimism keeps domestic
savings at home, and the fear of destroying useful domestic payments reduces or eliminates the
temptation for opportunistic default. This bene￿cial ￿￿nancial depth￿ e⁄ect lowers the risk of
foreign borrowing, further raising capital imports, investment and growth.
Alongside these examples of successful ￿nancial liberalization, there might be other middle-
income emerging markets for which ￿nancial liberalization does not work at all. Ex-ante, this
second group of countries look similar to those that succeed. The di⁄erence however is that they
are unlucky (unable?) and coordinate to the pessimistic equilibrium. As a result, the bene￿cial
￿nancial-depth e⁄ect no longer applies. Even worse, since these countries initially had a substantial
amount of domestic savings the detrimental capital-￿ ight e⁄ect is sizeable. Thus, these countries
end up exporting capital and experiencing a slowdown in investment and growth.
A key aspect of the theory then is that, for middle-income countries, self-ful￿lling expectations
play a crucial role. This can explain not only cross-sectional variation in the data, but also the
time-series variation for which country characteristics seem relatively stable. Shifts in investor
sentiment can lead to sudden stops of capital imports in successful countries. Shifts in investor
sentiment can also lead to large surges in capital imports in unsuccessful ones. In any case, and
unlike the case of poor emerging-markets, ￿nancial liberalization is likely to raise macroeconomic
volatility in middle-income emerging-markets.
Although this discussion is tentative, it illustrates the potential of the theory in explaining the
￿ndings of the empirical literature discussed in the introduction. In particular, it shows why ￿nan-
cial liberalizations are sometimes successful and sometimes not, and how country characteristics
and luck combine to determine this. With such a variety of possible experiences, it is only natural
that the one-size-￿ts-all policy package that comes out from the conventional view is likely to fail
in some countries. It is therefore important to tailor ￿nancial liberalization to the particular needs
of each speci￿c country. A full analysis of welfare and policy implications is possible and indeed
quite interesting. But this would make the paper too long so we must leave it for future research.
We cannot resist however concluding the paper with some speculative remarks on the theoretical
insights that we have gained on how to manage ￿nancial liberalization.
4 On how to manage ￿nancial liberalization
The conventional view was that a policy package that combines ￿nancial liberalization with struc-
tural reforms to raise productivity and improve institutions would put any emerging market in a
fast-track path to development. The theory developed here quali￿es this policy recommendation
33in a fundamental way by shifting the emphasis towards the importance of domestic asset trade.
Whether ￿nancial liberalization is successful or unsuccessful hinges on keeping this trade and this
in turn depends on country characteristics and luck.
Obviously, structural reforms that improve these country characteristics can help making ￿nan-
cial liberalization successful. Moreover, liberalization increases the incentives to carry out these
reforms. For instance, in our model the quality of enforcement institutions does not matter in au-
tarky but becomes crucial after ￿nancial liberalization. It would be interesting to formally model
how institutions evolve and develop further results. But we leave this task for future research.
Instead, we focus next on various policies that are less ambitious.34
Even if other policy instruments are not available, countries must still decide when to implement
a ￿nancial liberalization. Thus, the ￿rst and most rudimentary policy choice we consider is the
timing of ￿nancial liberalization. The conventional view regarding this choice is straightforward:
the earlier the better! After all, this view predicts all ￿nancial liberalizations to be successful. Is
there an equally simple and clearcut prediction coming from the theory developed here? At the
risk of oversimpli￿cation, we would argue that this is indeed the case and that our theory says:
unless the country is very poor, wait until it is ready! With pessimism, ￿nancial liberalization
destroys domestic asset trade. If the country is very poor, this does not matter much because this
trade was small to start with. Thus, ￿nancial liberalization still leads to capital imports and raises
investment and growth in very poor countries. If the country is not very poor, the destruction
of domestic asset trade is sizeable and leads to capital exports that lower investment and growth.
In this case, a country should wait to liberalize until optimism is possible. Even then, the theory
warns us that ￿nancial liberalization might be unsuccessful if investor sentiment turns out to be
pessimistic. Being ready is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for success.35
Waiting until the country has reached a su¢ ciently high level of development to liberalize
might not be too useful a policy advice for countries that are eager to raise the living standards
of their populations now and not later. Thus, a ￿rst question we must ask is: Is there any policy
that can be used to sustain optimism and give ￿nancial liberalization a chance to succeed when
fundamentals suggest that the country should wait? We know that, even if the country is ready,
34A caveat is in order: we do not focus on welfare and instead de￿ne a ￿nancial liberalization as ￿successful￿if it
results in capital imports.
35Of course, for this recommendation to be operational we must de￿ne what it means for a country to be ￿very
poor￿ and ￿ready￿ . Fortunately, the theory is quite precise about this. Recall that the discussion of the e⁄ects
of ￿nancial liberalization in a country with a very low initial capital stock identi￿ed three di⁄erent phases through
which the country would go through. A country is very poor when its initial capital stock is low enough that ￿nancial
liberalization would put the country in the ￿rst phase: kt ￿ ^ ￿t. A country is ready to liberalize only when its initial
capital stock is high enough so that, after ￿nancial liberalization, the country would skip the ￿rst and second phases:
kt ￿ ￿ ￿t.
34￿nancial liberalization might be unsuccessful if investor sentiment turns out to be pessimistic. Thus,
a second question that we must ask is: Is there any policy that can be used to rule out pessimism
and ensure that ￿nancial liberalization is successful? These two questions, of course, ask whether
there exist policies that make the optimistic equilibrium possible and rule out the pessimistic one.
The answers to these questions are positive under certain conditions. In the model there exist
two externalities associated with ￿nancial transactions. First, entrepreneurs borrow too much from
foreigners, which increases the incentives to default. That is why the optimistic equilibrium does
not always exist. It is easy to show that, by imposing controls on capital in￿ ows, the country
can always make the optimistic equilibrium possible. In particular, regardless of how low domestic
savings are, foreign borrowing can be reduced to a low enough level so that, if domestic savings
stay at home, enforcement is preferred ex-post.36 Second, savers do not lend enough domestically,
which also increases the incentives to default. That is why they sometimes send their savings
abroad leading to the pessimistic equilibrium. It is obvious that, by imposing controls on capital
out￿ ows, the country can always rule out the pessimistic equilibrium.37 Thus, a careful combination
of controls on capital in￿ ows and out￿ ows would ensure that liberalization leads to capital in￿ ows
and higher investment and growth without increasing volatility as a result of multiple equilibria.
Have we then found the policy solution to the problem of ￿nancial liberalization? Unfortunately
not, since we have cheated along the way. Capital controls can only be imposed if countries can
discriminate between foreign and domestic agents ex-ante, at the time of borrowing. But this seems
highly unlikely for the same reasons that ex-post discrimination is not realistic. For example, even
if the country guarantees that entrepreneurs borrow from domestic savers, nothing prevents these
savers from reselling the domestic assets to foreigners in secondary markets or swapping deposits
in domestic banks with deposits in foreign banks.38
In the absence of discriminatory policies, we are left only with policies that do not directly
address the externalities mentioned above. As a result, these policies tend to introduce additional
distortions. Policies of this kind include limits on borrowing, limits on investment, and forced
savings. A full analysis of these policies is worthwhile but would require a richer model.39
36Even if feasible, such policy might be counterproductive in countries with very low savings. The reason is
that in these countries net capital in￿ ows in such constrained optimistic equilibrium are in fact lower than in the
unconstrained pessimistic equilibrium.
37When the optimistic equilibrium exists, either because kt ￿ ￿ ￿t or because other policies have made it possible
even if kt < ￿ ￿t, forbidding capital out￿ ows ensures that the optimistic equilibrium is played and Prt[zt+1 = E] = 1.
When the optimistic equilibrium does not exist, forbidding out￿ ows leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium with
Prt[zt+1 = E] < 1, in which net capital in￿ ows are either zero or positive.
38Capital controls seem feasible only if countries implement sweeping controls on all foreign ￿nancial transactions.
But, in a world in which there is also a scope for international trade in goods, this would introduce additional
distortions. See Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2010) and Broner and Ventura (forthcoming) for a discussion of the
e⁄ects of capital controls and trade policy in such an environment.
39Note that in this model borrowing limits would have the same e⁄ect as controls on capital in￿ ows. But this is
35Finally, it is worth commenting on policies that a⁄ect the degree of discrimination. During the
1970s and early 1980s, in emerging markets governments borrowed abroad almost exclusively from
foreign banks using syndicated loans, while the private sector was largely shut out from international
￿nancial markets. This facilitated discrimination, as countries could choose not to pay to foreign
banks without interfering with domestic asset trade. This institutional setup changed in the 1990s
and 2000s. In particular, emerging markets lifted restrictions on the access of the private sector to
international markets and encouraged the development of secondary markets where domestic assets
can be traded. This has made discrimination much more di¢ cult. This shows that, to some extent,
countries can design their ￿nancial systems so as to achieve a certain degree of discrimination.
The theory proposed in this paper has clear implications regarding the degree of discrimination
that makes ￿nancial liberalization more likely to succeed. A country at an early stage of devel-
opment should adopt a ￿nancial system that facilitates discrimination, since this leads to higher
capital in￿ ows, investment, and growth. The reason is that with discrimination domestic ￿nancial
markets remain isolated from enforcement problems a⁄ecting foreign debts and the ￿capital ￿ ight￿
e⁄ect is avoided. A country at a late stage of development should adopt a ￿nancial system that
makes discrimination di¢ cult as this leads on average to higher capital in￿ ows, investment, and
growth.40 In this case, the ￿￿nancial depth￿e⁄ects dominates and the country can leverage on its
domestic ￿nancial markets to take better advantage of its access to international ￿nancial markets.
Interestingly, this is a possible explanation for the change in the institutional setup for emerging
market borrowing observed in the early 1990s, which has been taken largely as exogenous by the
previous literature.
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Appendix
In the conventional view of Section 1, generation t maximizes utility as described in Equation (1)
subject to the budget constraints in Equations (9) and (10) and the additional constraints that
kt+1 ￿ 0, b￿
t+1 ￿ 0 and bt+1 ￿ 0. When solving this problem, generation t takes asset returns and
the probability of enforcement as given. Let cE
t;t+1 and cN
t;t+1 denote consumption during old age
if zt+1 = E and zt+1 = N, respectively. After substituting the budget constraints into the utility
function, this maximization problem yields the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
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with bt+1 ￿ 0 and
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We can use these ￿rst-order conditions plus Equations (2), (7) and (8) to prove the four inter-
mediate results in the text. We ￿rst make two observations:
42￿ It must be the case that kt+1 > 0. Assume instead that kt+1 = 0. Then, it follows from
Equations (2) and (7) that rt+1 > R￿
t+1. It also follows that b￿





























and this is incompatible with the assumption that
kt+1 = 0. Therefore, kt+1 > 0.
￿ It must be the case that either b￿
t+1 > 0 or bt+1 < 0, but not both. Assume instead that
b￿









. But this is incompatible with the assumption that bt+1 < 0.
Therefore, either bt+1 < 0 or b￿
t+1 > 0, but not both.
These observations allow us to focus on two relevant cases. The ￿rst one is that in which
kt+1 > 0, b￿
t+1 ￿ 0 and bt+1 = 0. Substituting Equations (2), (7) and (8) into the ￿rst and third
Kuhn-Tucker conditions and manipulating the resulting two-equation system yields:





t+1 = s ￿ k￿
t
This case applies if and only if A￿s￿k￿
t ￿ (￿ ￿ A)
1
1￿￿. Otherwise we would reach the contradiction
that b￿
t+1 < 0.
The second relevant case is that in which kt+1 > 0, b￿
t+1 = 0 and bt+1 ￿ 0. Substituting
Equations (2), (7) and (8) into the ￿rst and second Kuhn-Tucker conditions and manipulating this
two-equation system yields:
A ￿ ￿ ￿ k￿￿1





+ ￿ ￿ bt+1 = s ￿ k￿
t
This case applies if and only if A￿s￿k￿
t ￿ (￿ ￿ A)
1
1￿￿. Otherwise we would reach the contradiction
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^ (b) Transitory shock to A
Figure 3: The Impact of Shocks under Autarky and Financial Liberalization









Figure 4: Laws of Motion with Domestic Asset Trade and Non-Discrimination
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Notes: xt describes the  deviation of variable xt from its autarky value, normalized by the economy's autarky GDP. In phases I and II only the pessimistic equilibrium exists. In phase III  both equilibria exist, and the optimistic 
one is played for several periods until the pessimistic one is played again. 
^ 
Phase I  Phase II  Phase III Time
(i) Positive savings shock leading to optimism
Time
(ii) Negative savings shock leading to pessimism
Time









(iii) Positive productivity shock leading to pessimism
Notes: xt describes the deviation of variable xt from its steady state value, normalized by the economy's steady-state GDP. In panels (i) and (iv), the economy starts in the pessimistic equilibrium and the shock makes the 
optimistic equilibrium feasible, which is then played for several periods. Eventually, a period of pessimism returns the economy to its original steady state. In panels (ii) and (iii), the economy starts in the optimistc 
equilibrium and the shock makes this equilibrium temporarily infeasible. The economy returns to it as soon as it becomes feasible again.
^
Figure 6: Shocks under Financial Liberalization without Discrimination